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MEMORANDUM CASES 879 
[42 C.2d 879; 269 P.2d 881] 
[L. A. No. 23082. In Bank. May 11, 1954. J 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY (a Corporation), 
Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMIS-
SION and DOYLE WYA'l'T, Respondents. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission allowing a credit against an award of com-
pensation for personal injuries. Award affirmed in part and 
annulled in part with directions. 
Leonard, Hanna & Brophy and Edmund D. Leonard for 
Petitioner. 
Everett A. Corten, Gordon W. Winbigler and T. Groesinger 
for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-The question presented in this proceeding 
to review an award of the Industrial Accident Commission 
is the same as that in R. E. Spriggs, Inc. v. Industrial Ace. 
Com., ante, p. 785 [269 P.2d 876]. · 
Doyle Wyatt, a farm laborer in the employ of Norman 
Potter, doing business as Potter Nursery, sustained a com-
pensable injury as a result of the assertedly negligent opera-
tion of an automobile by a third party. Wyatt settled his 
claim for damages against the third party for $1,000. Of 
that amount, $215.93 was paid to the employer's insurer in 
satisfaction of a lien for previous compensation expenditures. 
Wyatt's attorney received $357.50 for attorney's fees. The 
Industrial Accident Commission deducted from the credit 
allowed the employer's insurer the amount paid by Wyatt 
as an attorney's fee, allowing only $426.57 plus a credit of 
$112.64 for prior disability payments. 
For the reasons stated in the Spriggs case, that portion of 
the award crediting Industrial Indemnity Company with 
only $539.21 is annulled, with directions to the commission 
to increase the amount to $896.71; in all other respects, the 
award is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, and Bray, 
J. pro tern.,* concurred. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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CARTER, J.-I dissent for the same reasons stated by me 
in R. E. Spriggs, Inc. v. Industrial Ace. Com., ante, p. 785 
[269 P.2d 876]. In addition, however, this case squarely 
presents the wholly unjust situation mentioned by me in my 
dissent in Dodds v. Stellar, 30 Cal.2d 496 [183 P.2d 658]. 
I there said that as a result of denying the employee the right 
to deduct counsel fees incurred in recovering from the tort 
feasor, the employee might well receive less than the work-
men's compensation payable to him. That result is reached 
here despite the legislative amendments designed to alleviate 
the injustice. Here the compensation amounted to $896.71. 
The employee received $1,000 in settlement from the tort 
feasor. He had to pay his attorney $357.50 leaving a balance 
of $642.50, thus receiving less than the compensation to 
which he was entitled. 
[42 C.2d 880; 271 P.2d 4] 
[L. A. No. 22940. In Bank. )\(lay 27, 1954.) 
JOHN RIX TYRELL, Petitioner, v. THE COMMITTEE OF 
BAR EXAMINERS et al., Respondents. 
PROCEEDING to review resolution of Committee of Bar 
Examiners denying an application for admission to practice 
law without examination. Petition denied. 
Donald G. Hall for Petitioner. 
Richard J. Archer for Respondents. 
THE COURT.-John Rix Tyrell seeks to review a resolu-
tion of the Committee of Bar Examiners denying his applica-
tion under section 6060.8 of the Business and Professions Code 
for admission to practice law without examination. The basis 
of the committee's action was the determination that Tyrell 
had not "entered upon active duty in the armed forces" as 
required by that section. 
After serving in the United States Naval Reserve during 
World War II, Tyrell was released to inactive duty. He 
commenced the study of law and in June 1952, was graduated 
from an accredited law school. The next final bar examina-
tion was conducted in October of that year. 
